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Highlights
 – in order to foster infrastructure investment, National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) may exempt privately funded electricity interconnectors from one or 
more of the following: (i) regulated third party access (TpA), (ii) restrictions 
on the use of congestion revenues, (iii) tariff regulation and (iv) ownership 
unbundling.
 – National exemption decisions are reviewed by the European commission 
(Ec) when interconnectors touch two or more Member States. So far, four 
so-called “merchant” projects have reached the Ec (all were approved): Es-
tlink (2005), BritNed (2007), imera/East-West cables (2008) and Arnold-
stein-Tarvisio (2010). 
 – Without explanation, the Ec has been gradually tightening the reins on the 
exemption regime since first approving an exemption in 2005. yet analysis of 
these cases reveals an implicit set of preferences narrowly tailored to enable 
the development of a high-risk project without unduly advantaging its spon-
sor. 
 – By analysing the existing EU exemption cases, this policy brief aims to un-
cover the Ec’s implicit preferences with regards to exemptions from the regu-
latory provisions governing cross-border interconnector development and 
operation.
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Background
The Electricity Directive generally promotes electricity in-
terconnector investment on a fully regulated basis by a 
transmission system operator (TSo) in order to “ensur[e] 
the long term ability of the system to meet reasonable de-
mands for the transmission of electricity.”1 As an exception, 
exemptions from the regulatory framework are available 
in cases where an interconnector’s risk level is “such that 
the investment would not take place unless the exemption 
is granted.”2 The primary risks affecting interconnector in-
vestments are non-use and future change in costs and/or 
revenues, e.g. revenues would be negatively affected by vol-
ume or price fluctuations or future changes to congestion 
management rules.3 Exemptions give project owners greater 
control over cash flow, which increases business opportu-
nity when determining an investment’s payback period. A 
full exemption provides maximum control, by making in-
applicable regulated TpA, restrictions on the use of conges-
tion revenues, regulation of tariffs and since 3 March 2011 
ownership unbundling; however, such independence from 
the regulatory framework may be detrimental to competi-
tion. For example, where an exemption from regulated TpA 
enables a dominant undertaking in one of the linked mar-
kets “ to consolidate its position or otherwise foreclose the 
market.”4 Thus, partial exemptions (i.e. exemptions covering 
only a portion of total capacity or, for example, applying to 
third party access but not tariff regulation) may be granted 
to projects whose business risk level does not justify the po-
tential risk to competition of a full exemption.5 
Eligibility for an exemption
The existing EU regulatory framework promotes electricity 
interconnector investment within a regulated access regime 
as part of a Member State’s regulated asset base (“RAB”). Ex-
emptions are intended to enable investment only in those 
projects deemed too risky to be developed as part of the 
RAB. To determine eligibility for an exemption, a project 
must pass a six-part risk and competition analysis outlined 
1. Article 12(a) of the Electricity Directive and section 1.1 
of commission Staff Working paper SEc(2009)642.
2. Article 7(1)(b) of the Electricity Regulation.
3. Section 1.3(10) of commission Staff Working paper SEc(2009)642.
4. See section 35 of the Exemption decision on the East-West-cable 
project, dated 19 December 2008 (the “imera Exemption Decision”).
5. “Exemptions must be limited to what is strictly necessary to realize 
the investment and the scope of the exemption has to be proportionate.” 
Section 1.3(17) of commission Staff Working paper SEc(2009)642.
in Article 17(1) of the Electricity Regulation (the “Thresh-
old Test”). This determination is made by each NRA on a 
case-by-case basis and, ultimately, approved or rejected by 
the Ec in cases where interconnectors involve more than 
one Member State. A successful applicant is eligible for an 
exemption from one or more of the following (i) regulated 
TpA, (ii) restrictions on the use of congestion revenues, (iii) 
tariff regulation and (iv) ownership unbundling.
Box 1 - The current exemption request procedure
1. Submit Request. Applicant submits a “request for 
exemption” to the NRAs
2. National Decision(s). Since the establishment of ACER, 
the NRAs must inform ACER of their decision within six 
months. If the NRAs do not reach a decision, ACER may 
decide on their behalf
3. EC Review. Within two months after being notified (?) 
of a national-decision, the EC will either approve the 
exemption or request that the NRAs modify or withdraw 
their decision6
What is the Role of the EC in the Exemption 
Decision Process?
Exemptions granted by NRAs are subject to Ec review 
where projects involve two or more Member States. Such 
practice shall “ensure a consistent application of the exemp-
tion practice and safeguard the wider European interest.”7 
The Ec may approve, reject or modify a national exemption 
decision in the final stages of the exemption request pro-
cess, making the process itself a significant risk for investors. 
These late stage conditions are not yet predictable, and, thus, 
represent a risk for merchant projects that typically incur 
several years of planning costs before submitting an exemp-
tion request. Aggravating this situation, the Ec’s actual cri-
teria in making a decision are not yet fully revealed, appear-
ing only implicitly in the exemption decisions. 
6.This initial two-month period is subject to extension where the Ec 
requests additional information or by consent of the relevant parties
7. Note 4, at section 12.
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The Cases So Far
Estlink (2005). Estlink is a submarine 350 MW HVDc 
twin-cable interconnector constructed to link the electric-
ity transmission grids of Estonia and Finland. on 27 April 
2005, the Ec confirmed the national level exemption from 
regulated third party access, restrictions on the use of con-
gestion revenues and tariff regulation until 31 December 
2013. on or before that date, Estlink will be transferred to 
Fingrid oy and the TSos in the Baltic States. The Ec did not 
request any modification to the NRA decision.
BritNed (2007).  BritNed is a submarine 1000 MW HVDc 
cable constructed to link the electricity transmission grids of 
Great Britain and the Netherlands. on 18 october 2007, the 
Ec approved a twenty-five year exemption. However, due to 
its concern that BritNed may have undersized the capacity 
of the interconnector in order to artificially inflate conges-
tion revenues, the Ec requested that the NRAs amend their 
exemption decisions with the addition of a financial review 
after ten years of operation. At such time, BritNed must 
present the NRAs with a report of total costs, total revenues 
and the rate of return using 2007 as a base year.8 if the actual 
ex post revenue estimate is more than one percentage point 
greater than the estimate contained in BritNed’s exemption 
request, BritNed will be given two options: (a) increase ca-
pacity – this additional capacity will not be covered auto-
matically by the original exemption; or (b) cap any profits 
(discounted to 2007 levels) that exceed BritNed’s estimated 
rate of return by more than one percentage point and sur-
render such excess to be used to finance the RAB in the UK 
and the Netherlands.9
imera/East-West cables (2008).  imera is a submarine 700 
MW HVDc dual-cable interconnector that was anticipated 
to link the grids of ireland and Great Britain. on 19 De-
cember 2008, the Ec approved a twenty-five year exemption 
from regulated third party access, restrictions on the use of 
congestion revenues and tariff regulation. in its analysis, the 
Ec concluded that imera satisfied the risk threshold only 
because of the “significantly higher economic risk” created 
by the planned development of a competing, fully regulated 
interconnector (EirGrid).10 The completion of EirGrid and 
the actual availability of its capacity were the principal con-
ditions to approval.11 other conditions included: a 40% ca-
8. Section 13(a) of the BritNed Exemption Decision by 
the European commission, dated 18 october 2007.
9. Supra at subsections 13(b)(i) and (b)(ii).
10. Section 25 of the imera Exemption Decision.
11. Id. at sections 27 and 55.
pacity cap for any dominant undertaking in either system 
or market to which the interconnector is connected; effec-
tive congestion management pursuant to the congestion 
Management Guidelines, including intra-day trading; and, 
assessment by cER and ofgem of the effectiveness of imera’s 
facilitated secondary trading and Uioli procedures.12 
Arnoldstein-Tarvisio (2010). Arnoldstein-Tarvisio is an 
overland Austria to italy Ac interconnector with a nomi-
nal voltage of 132kV and a maximum capacity of 160 MVA. 
on 26 october 2010, the Ec issued a decision approving 
the exemption but requesting that the 50% exemption from 
regulated TpA granted by the NRAs should be withdrawn 
altogether so that 100% of capacity is available for auction. 
Rejecting the applicant’s argument that reserving capacity 
was necessary to recover its investment, the Ec reasoned 
that since the congestion management guidelines require 
unused capacity to be sold on the secondary market, reserv-
ing capacity was not necessary to recovering the investment. 
Auctioning 100% of capacity should be equally as effective.13 
in addition, any further exemption for significant capacity 
increases must be approved by the Ec; and, the exemption 
will expire if the interconnector is not operational within 
five years.14
Shedding Some Light on the EC’s Reasoning
The analysis of the existing cases reveals an implicit set of 
preferences on the Ec’s side as an exemption can touch one 
or more of TpA, congestion revenues, tariffs and unbundling 
to differing degrees (from full exemption to very partial or 
very temporary exemption). To shed some light on the Ec’s 
reasoning, we use a three-point approach consisting of the 
three conditions raised most often in the Ec’s decisions (see 
Box 2). 
out of four cases, only one (Estlink) was approved without 
the imposition of additional conditions. As Box 2(c) shows, 
the Ec imposed conditions on the other three merchant 
interconnectors based solely on the third point of analy-
sis: “whether exempting a project from certain aspects of 
regulation would harm competition.” in other words, it was 
the sanctioned departure from the regulatory framework, 
not the proposed interconnector itself that the Ec deemed 
problematic. A “Maybe” led, in all cases, to the imposition 
12. Id. at section 56.
13. Sections 22-27 of the Arnoldstein-Tarvisio 
Exemption Decision, dated 26/10/2010.
14. Id. at sections 35-41.
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of additional conditions intended to ensure conformity with 
the exemption criteria, e.g. the review of revenues imposed 
on BritNed was intended to counterbalance the risk that 
BritNed intentionally undersized capacity in order to boost 
revenues from artificially created congestion.15
Conclusion
Since approving the first exemption in 2005, the Ec has been 
gradually tightening the reins on the exemption regime: the 
Estlink exemption was approved by the Ec without con-
dition, while the latest decision, Arnoldstein-Tarvisio, re-
15. Note 4, at Box 7.
quested the complete withdrawal of a national level TpA 
exemption. in the absence of explicit evidence, it is not clear 
whether the Ec’s increased stringency represents an inten-
tional shift in attitude towards the exemption regime (and/
or divergence in the Ec’s standards and those of national 
regulators). it is clear, however, that the spectre of additional 
conditions in the final stage of the exemption approval pro-
cess has a de facto chilling effect on merchant investment. At 
a time when additional interconnection capacity is crucial to 
the achievement of the single energy market in 2014, the Ec 
might consider loosening its grip?
Box 2 
(a) Three Conditions for an Approval of an Exemption
The interconnector must enhance 
competition
A general competition analysis is conducted – the interconnector must show a positive 
effect on competition. 
The risk level must necessitate an 
exemption
The risks must rise to a level that rules out development of the interconnector as a regu-
lated investment.
Granting an exemption must leave 
competition unharmed
Focus is on whether exempting the project from regulation would harm competition 
conditions.
(b) The EC’s Analysis of the Four Cases
EstLink BritNed Imera Arnoldstein -Tarvisio
Would the 
interconnector 
enhance 
competition?
YES YES YES YES
Does risk level 
necessitate an 
exemption?
YES YES YES YES
Would exemption 
leave competition 
unharmed?
YES MAYBE MAYBE MAYBE
(c) Consequences of a “Maybe” by the EC
Additional 
Conditions 
Imposed à
Review of Revenues 
(de facto cap)
Cap on Capacity 
share held by any 
single party
Congestion 
Management 
Requirements 
Withdraw Exemption
BritNed X
Imera X X
Arnoldstein-
Tarvisio
X
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